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Large robust games
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DOI：10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x.png)
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Abstract
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With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.
Keywords:
anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Bayesian equilibrium
robust equilibrium
ex post Nash
purification
rational expectations
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