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Latent and Weaponized Nuclear Coercion: A Review Article
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DOI：10.1093/psquar/qqaf154.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
How does the potential to construct a nuclear weapon shape international politics? Matthew Fuhrmann's important new book explains why nuclear latent state efforts at deterrence by threats of proliferation, delayed retaliation, and doubts about their nuclear status succeed or fail. He finds that the level of enrichment capabilities, political stakes, and intentions shape the likelihood that each discrete deterrence pathway pays dividends or generates costs. This review article explores Fuhrmann's wide-ranging analysis. It then applies the book's insights to examine why Iran's latent nuclear capability failed to deter the June 2025 Israeli-U.S. strikes. Latent nuclear deterrence theory successfully explains important elements of the attack. The article examines ways to integrate insights into the role that countries with and without nuclear arms may attempt to coerce and assure. Nuclear latency is not unique to any one part of the nuclear era. Fuhrmann provides theoretical, empirical, and policy contributions to understanding nuclear dynamics as the world traverses another tumultuous decade of the nuclear age.
Keywords:
nuclear latency
deterrence
coercion
preventative strikes
Iran
nuclear posture
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