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Learning traps

delete2026-10-28
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OA
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H
Hassan Sayed *
DOI:10.1111/ajps.70088delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
When constituents are uncertain about whether leaders' policy preferences align with their interests, policy choices generate a trade-off between payoffs and information. Leaders can experiment with their preferred policy, but if the outcome is bad, constituents learn this and threaten office removal. I use a repeated model of political agency to analyze how this trade-off shapes long-lived, term-unlimited leaders' policy choices. When there is uncertainty about the optimal policy for constituents, leaders implement “learning traps”: spatially intermediate policies that halt learning about what the best policy is. They experiment only when their preferences are very likely to be aligned with constituents, a contrast to the “gambling for resurrection” logic ubiquitous in the literature. I provide a case study that examines how the 1861 reforms ending Serfdom in Imperial Russia represented the logic of a “learning trap” and illustrate additional applications of the model to political contagion and economic policymaking.

Journal

American Journal of Political Science cover
American Journal of Political Science
IF:
5.6
Papers:
2.7K
Citations:
2.0W

Organization

C
Center for Global Development
Scholars:
1
Papers: 2
Citations: 1
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

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Persistence of power, elites, and institutions
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