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Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Rules
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DOI：10.1086/682389.png)
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Abstract
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We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in the assembly. We predict that the agenda protocol chosen in equilibrium disproportionately favors more senior legislators, granting them greater opportunities to make policy proposals, and it generates an incumbency advantage to all legislators.
Keywords:
PROPOSAL POWER
MAJORITY-RULE
MODEL
CANDIDATE
SENIORITY
VALENCE
EQUILIBRIUM
INCUMBENCY
ELECTIONS
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