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Legislative hostage-taking
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DOI：10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105183.png)
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Abstract
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Legislative hostage-taking—whereby the minority party refuses to pass a bipartisan policy unless another divisive or contentious policy also passes—has become a frequent occurrence, especially in American politics. We develop a dynamic model of legislative bargaining and electoral politics to provide insights into why hostage-taking occurs, which policies are held hostage, and which policies are demanded as ransom. Our key insight is that (credible) hostage-taking can only occur if the divisive policy benefits the voter. Furthermore, when hostage-taking occurs, it benefits the voter. However, these benefits are potentially tempered if parties can engage in policy design. In particular, hostage-taking can generate a perverse incentive for the majority party to engage in money burning to shield themselves from the minority party’s hostage-taking.
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