.png){kind=icon}
Return
Localized perfection
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jet.2026.106183.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Perfect equilibrium and its refinements are widely studied and typically rely on full-support perturbations. We introduce a S-localized notion of perfection for games with a continuum of players. It confines perturbations within a S-neighborhood of the underlying action distribution and eliminates undesirable equilibria from a local perspective. We establish the existence of a pure strategy S-localized perfect equilibrium and show that it is equivalent to S-admissible Nash equilibrium. We also study limit versions of S-localized perfection. Illustrative applications to large routing games and crowd saturation games are presented.
Keywords:
Large games
Nash equilibrium
delta-localized perfect equilibrium
delta-admissible nash equilibrium
Limit localized perfection
Journal
J
IF:
1.2
Papers:
68
Citations:
0
Organization
View more organizations
Cited Papers
.png){kind=icon}
ShareSave
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSave
ShareSaveShareSave View more