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Long cheap talk
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DOI：10.1111/1468-0262.00465.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. (Cheap talk means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.
Keywords:
cheap talk
communication
long conversation
incomplete information
game theory
signalling
joint lottery
dimartingale
di-span
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