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Menu Dependence and Group Decision Making

delete2013-03-06
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PRE
AI
S
Susumu Cato *
DOI:10.1007/s10726-013-9343-9delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
This paper is concerned with the problem of group decision making. We introduce the notion of a collective system rule. A collective system rule maps each preference profile to a group-preference system, which is a collection of social preferences on the subsets of the alternatives. By formulating the Arrovian conditions, we show the Arrow-type impossibility theorems. We also discuss how our approach is related to the standard group decision-making process.
Keywords:
Collective system rule
Group decision making
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Preference system
Nestedness
Menu-dependent preference

Journal

Group Decision and Negotiation cover
Group Decision and Negotiation
IF:
2.5
Papers:
1.3K
Citations:
1.4K

Organization

No organization information available