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Modelling attacks on self-authentication watermarking
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PRE
AI
DOI：10.1007/s11042-015-2893-x.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Although the Self-Authentication Watermarking (SAW) schemes are promising to tackle the multimedia information assurance problem, their unknown security level seems to impair their potential. In this paper, we identify three new counterfeiting attacks on those schemes and present their countermeasure. We develop, analyse, and validate the models of the identified attacks followed by the development of a new SAW model to resist those attacks. The identified attack models generalize three main security levels that capture all the possible counterfeiting instances. We focus on the block-wise dependent fragile watermarking schemes, and their general weaknesses. Experimental results successfully demonstrate the practicality and consequences of the identified attacks in exploiting those weaknesses to maliciously and undetectably alter valid watermarked images. To resist the identified attacks, we further determine a set of general requirements for SAW schemes and illustrate their attainment in developing an extended SAW model. While the identified attack models can be used as a means to systematically examine the security levels of similar SAW schemes, the extended SAW model may lead to developing their more secure variants. Our study has also revealed some open challenges in the development and formal analysis of SAW schemes.
Keywords:
Counterfeiting attack
Fragile watermarking
Information assurance
Multimedia security
Self-authentication
Journal
IF:
3
Papers:
1.9W
Citations:
3.2W