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Modularity and mental architecture
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DOI：10.1002/wcs.1255.png)
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Abstract
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Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor's landmark book The Modularity of Mind. According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low-level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor's critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine-grained functional specialization dictated by natural selection, and it characterizes virtually all aspects of cognitive architecture, including high-level systems for judgment, decision making, and reasoning. Though both of these perspectives on modularity have garnered support, the current state of evidence and argument suggests that a broader skepticism about modularity may be warranted. (C) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:641-649. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1255 Conflict of interest: The author has declared no conflicts of interest for this article. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Keywords:
HUMAN FUSIFORM GYRUS
SOCIAL-EXCHANGE
COGNITION
BRAIN
SEE
SPECIALIZATION
ILLUSIONS
LANGUAGE
SYSTEM
MIND
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