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Money Doctors

delete2015-01-19
delete255
PRE
AI
N
Nicola Gennaioli *
A
Andrei Shleifer
R
Robert W. Vishny
DOI:10.1111/jofi.12188delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average underperform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.
Keywords:
MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY
FINANCIAL ADVICE
CAREER CONCERNS
STOCK-MARKET
RETURNS
PERFORMANCE
PRICE
INVESTMENT
COSTS
COMPETITION
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Journal

Journal of Finance cover
Journal of Finance
IF:
9.5
Papers:
4.0K
Citations:
5.0W

Organization

H
Harvard University
Scholars:
26.5W
Papers: 22.0W
Citations: 28.7W
B
Bocconi University
Scholars:
1.9K
Papers: 2.4K
Citations: 4.8K
U
university of chicago
Scholars:
4.4W
Papers: 3.7W
Citations: 80
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