.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Monitoring for Worker Quality
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1086/690713.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Much nonmanagerial work is routine, with all workers having similar output most of the time. However, failure to address occasional challenges can be very costly, and consequently easily detected, while challenges handled well pass unnoticed. We analyze job assignment and worker monitoring for such guardian jobs. If monitoring costs are positive but small, monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm's belief about the probability that a worker is good. The model explains several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor markets: low use of performance pay, seniority pay, rare demotions, wage ceilings within grade, and wage jumps at promotion.
Keywords:
PERSONNEL DATA
FIRMS
WAGE
PROMOTIONS
DYNAMICS
PERFORMANCE
EFFICIENCY
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.