logo
CanyamAI summaries for academic research
language
MobileMobile
  • Phone FeatureWeChat Mini Program
EnglishEnglish
noticeNotice
BlogBlog
delete
arrow
Return

Monitoring, liquidation, and security design

delete1998-01-01
delete52
PRE
AI
R
Rafael Repullo *
J
Javier Suárez
DOI：10.1093/rfs/11.1.163delete
deleteOriginal
deleteOriginal request for help
deleteShare
deleteSave
Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
By identifying the possibility of imposing a credible threat of liquidation as the key role of informed (bank) finance in a moral hazard context, we characterize the circumstances under which a mixture of informed and uniformed (market) finance is optimal, and explain why bank debt is typically secured, senior, and tightly held We also show that the effectiveness of mixed finance may be impaired by the possibility of collusion between the firms and their informed lenders, and that in the optimal renegotiation-proof contract informed debt capacity will be exhausted before appealing to supplementary uniformed finance.
Keywords:
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
BANK LOANS
DEBT
CHOICE
REPUTATION
AI Summary

AI Summary

Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.

Journal

Review of Financial Studies cover
Review of Financial Studies
IF:
5.4
Papers:
2.8K
Citations:
3.0W

Organization

No organization information available