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Monotonicity and Implementability
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DOI：10.3982/ECTA8882.png)
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Abstract
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Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.
Keywords:
Monotone
cyclic monotonicity
implementable
dominant strategies
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