Moral Judgments

Bertram F. Malle

doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-072220-104358

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Moral Judgments

2021-01-04

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Bertram F. Malle *

DOI：10.1146/annurev-psych-072220-104358

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Abstract

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Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments-evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.

Keywords:

moral psychology

ethics

social psychology

moral cognition

social cognition

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