.png){kind=icon}
Return
Morale hazard
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.02.001.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We interpret workers' confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the implication of worker overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers' morale; the non-differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
overconfidence
worker morale
wage-setting policies
Journal
IF:
4.1
Papers:
3.2K
Citations:
1.1W
Organization
No organization information available
Cited Papers
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveAn Experimental Study of the Heat Storage and the Discharge Performance and an Economic Performance Analysis of a Flat Plate Phase Change Material (PCM) Storage Tank.png)
Energies
OAAI
EnergiesIF0
OAAIShareSave
View more