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Multilateral bargaining

delete1996-01-01
delete156
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OA
AI
K
Krishna, V *
R
Roberto Serrano
DOI：10.2307/2298115delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory of bargaining.
Keywords:
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM

Journal

Review of Economic Studies cover
Review of Economic Studies
IF:
6.4
Papers:
2.5K
Citations:
2.1W

Organization

No organization information available