.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Navigating policy uncertainty: Politically experienced directors and corporate investment
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
D
B
P
Z
J
DOI：10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2026.103008.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We examine whether politically experienced independent directors (PEDs) can mitigate the harmful investment effects of policy uncertainty. Our results indicate that the presence of PEDs on corporate boards significantly reduces the sensitivity of investment decisions to policy uncertainty. These effects are particularly pronounced for PEDs with presidential committee experience and concentrated in investments characterized by higher irreversibility. Drawing on political risk premium theory and the real options framework, we design several tests to address endogeneity concerns and rule out alternative explanations. Our findings are consistent with PEDs playing an advisory role that helps firms navigate policy uncertainty when making investment decisions.
Keywords:
Policy uncertainty
Directors
Political experience
Investment
G31
G34
G38
M48
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
5.9
Papers:
2.5K
Citations:
2.0W
Organization
Cited Papers