.png){kind=icon}
Return
Nonparametric adverse selection problems
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1023/A:1021001917492.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a whole utility function and cannot be reduced to some finite-dimensional parameter. In this case, incentive-compatibility conditions can be conveniently expressed using some abstract convexity notions arising for instance in Mass Transfer Theory. After this characterization is provided, an existence result of optimal incentive-compatible contracts is proved. Finally, several economic examples are considered including applications to regulation and labor contracting.
Keywords:
principal-agent problems
contract theory
abstract convex analysis
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
4.5
Papers:
8.1K
Citations:
2.1W
Organization
No organization information available
Cited Papers
No cited papers available