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On Dynamic Pricing

delete2026-02-01
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PRE
AI
I
Ilia Krasikov *
R
Rohit Lamba
DOI:10.1257/mic.20220124delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a Poisson process. A combination of membership fees and continuously increasing prices induces a threshold response from the buyer, endogenously segmenting the market along timing of purchase. This pricing mechanism achieves the deterministic global optimum. The tools developed here are shown to be useful in thinking about global incentives in dynamic mechanisms, and mapping dynamic pricing to the classic taxonomy of consumer-producer surplus and deadweight loss. (JEL D21, D82, D86)
Keywords:
MECHANISM DESIGN

Journal

A
American Economic Journal-Microeconomics
IF:
2.1
Papers:
37
Citations:
1.8K

Organization

A
arizona state university
Scholars:
3.8K
Papers: 2.0K
Citations: 0
A
arizona state university-tempe
Scholars:
1.5W
Papers: 1.2W
Citations: 13
Cited Papers

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