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Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
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AI
DOI：10.1093/restud/rdw013.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent's ability, dynamic moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction that generally precludes efficiency. Our model permits an explicit characterization of optimal contracts.
Keywords:
Innovation
Learning
Adverse selection
Adverse selection
Moral hazard
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