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Optimizing subsidy strategies for high-speed railways: A Stackelberg game approach between local governments and railway operators
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DOI：10.1016/j.rtbm.2025.101498.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
• Analysis and calculation of the income and expense structure of the subsidy entity. • The governments and the China Railway Corporation form a Stackelberg game relationship. • Boosting passenger flow and reducing financial costs can increase subsidy entity's profit. • The game-theoretic model is simplified into a data curve to facilitate the solution process.
Keywords:
High-speed railway
Local government
Major shareholders
Subsidy policy
Stackelberg game
Journal
R
IF:
4.4
Papers:
1.0K
Citations:
3.4K
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