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Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives

delete1997-06-01
delete184
PRE
AI
M
Meyer, MA *
J
John Vickers
DOI：10.1086/262082delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal-agent relationships by improving the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives, for example, managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation. We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency. The overall welfare effects of CPI are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure.
Keywords:
YARDSTICK COMPETITION
CONTRACTS
ORGANIZATIONS
COMPENSATION
TOURNAMENTS
COOPERATION
PERSPECTIVE
AGENCY
DESIGN
PRIZES
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Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.

Journal

Journal of Political Economy cover
Journal of Political Economy
IF:
6.3
Papers:
2.6K
Citations:
3.2W

Organization

No organization information available