.png){kind=icon}
Return
Platform pricing and data bargaining
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112935.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We analyse a subscription platform that commits to capacity, bargains bilaterally with subscribers over data provision or paid privacy, and then charges a market-clearing access fee. Because failed negotiations can be replaced by other subscribers, the platform's capacity commitment (and the resulting subscriber base) determines the size of the replacement pool and hence bargaining power. Under opt-in (the platform buys data), capacity tends to expand to depress data payments; under opt-out (users buy privacy), capacity tends to contract to raise privacy charges. Privacy prices internalise the opportunity cost of foregone data. Journal of Economic Literature.
Keywords:
Data pricing
Platforms
Bargaining
Privacy
Journal
E
IF:
1.8
Papers:
348
Citations:
0
Organization
Cited Papers
.png){kind=icon}
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSave
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSave no more
no more