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Politicizing consumer credit

delete2021-02-01
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OA
AI
A
Akey, Pat
H
Heimer, Rawley Z. *
L
Lewellen, Stefan
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.017delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Powerful politicians can interfere with the enforcement of regulations. As such, expected political interference can affect constituents' behavior. Using rotations of Senate committee chairs to identify variation in political power and expected regulatory relief, we study powerful politicians' effect on consumer lending to communities protected by fair-lending regulations. We find a 7.5% reduction in credit access to minority neighborhoods in states with new committee chairs. Larger reductions occur in Community Reinvestment Act-eligible neighborhoods and when Senators serve on committees that oversee the enforcement of fair-lending laws. Banks headquartered in powerful Senators' states are responsible for the reduction in credit access. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Political connections
Consumer credit
Political economy
Household finance
Regulatory enforcement
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Journal

Journal of Financial Economics cover
Journal of Financial Economics
IF:
12
Papers:
3.8K
Citations:
5.5W

Organization

P
pennsylvania commonwealth system of higher education (pcshe)
Scholars:
12.9W
Papers: 11.7W
Citations: 177
B
Boston College
Scholars:
5.5K
Papers: 5.2K
Citations: 8.8K
U
university of toronto
Scholars:
14.8W
Papers: 12.0W
Citations: 165
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