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PREFERENCE AGGREGATION WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
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DOI：10.3982/ECTA11612.png)
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Abstract
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We show in an environment of incomplete information that monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event, and (ii) aggregation must be ex ante and ex post utilitarian with respect to that common prior and individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utility indices.
Keywords:
Social choice
incomplete information
Harsanyi's theorem
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