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Preferences for Truth-Telling

delete2019-01-01
delete393
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OA
AI
A
Abeler, Johannes *
D
Daniele Nosenzo
R
Raymond, Collin
DOI:10.3982/ECTA14673delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.
Keywords:
Private information
honesty
truth-telling
lying
meta study
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Journal

Econometrica cover
Econometrica
IF:
7.1
Papers:
3.0K
Citations:
4.3W

Organization

Purdue University System cover
Purdue University System
Scholars:
3.9W
Papers: 3.6W
Citations: 66
U
university of oxford
Scholars:
9.8W
Papers: 8.6W
Citations: 137
I
Ifo Institut
Scholars:
334
Papers: 314
Citations: 2
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