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Private Delegated Computations Using Strong Isolation
DOI:10.1109/TETC.2023.3281738.png)
Abstract
En 中文
Computations are now routinely delegated to third-parties. In response, Confidential Computing technologies are being added to microprocessors offering a trusted execution environment (TEE) that provides confidentiality and integrity guarantees to code and data hosted within-even in the face of a privileged attacker. TEEs, along with an attestation protocol, permit remote third-parties to establish a trusted beachhead containing known code and data on an otherwise untrusted machine. Yet, they introduce many new problems, including: how to ease provisioning of computations safely into TEEs; how to develop distributed systems spanning multiple classes of TEE; and what to do about the billions of legacy devices without support for Confidential Computing? Tackling these problems, we introduce Veracruz, a pragmatic framework that eases the design and implementation of complex privacy-preserving, collaborative, delegated computations among a group of mutually mistrusting principals. Veracruz supports multiple isolation technologies and provides a common programming model and attestation protocol across all of them, smoothing deployment of delegated computations over supported technologies. We demonstrate Veracruz in operation, on private in-cloud object detection on encrypted video streaming from a video camera. In addition to supporting hardware-backed TEEs-like AWS Nitro Enclaves and Arm Confidential Computing Architecture Realms-Veracruz also provides pragmatic software TEEs on Armv8-A devices without hardware Confidential Computing capability, using the high-assurance seL4 microkernel and our IceCap framework.
Keywords:
Codes
Smoothing methods
Microprocessors
Object detection
Streaming media
Programming
Isolation technology
Confidential computing
trusted execution environments
Veracruz
IceCap
seL4
software enclaves
attestation
Journal
IF:
5.4
Papers:
1.1K
Citations:
3.4K

