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Probability by Convention
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AI
DOI：10.1007/s10992-026-09831-z.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Probabilism-the doctrine that ideally rational degrees of belief conform to the calculus of probabilities-is habitually defended by citing Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments. Yet these arguments rely on premises that are not plausibly necessary truths. I argue that the premises in question can be understood as fixing a convention. Relaxing these premises leads to alternative calculi which-under permissive though not universal assumptions-are intertranslatable with the probability calculus. This applies to Dutch-book and accuracy-dominance arguments alike; a mathematical correspondence is shown to hold between them.
Keywords:
Probability
Probabilism
Dutch book argument
Gradational accuracy