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Property tax competition: A quantitative assessment
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DOI：10.1016/j.jue.2026.103861.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We investigate which of four alternative taxation regimes often used in the public finance literature best approximates actual property taxation in Japan and Germany. To that end, we develop a model of property taxation and characterize equilibria under four alternative regimes: the Benthamite, rent-seeking, land-rent maximization, and tax harmonization regimes. We characterize possible sources of fiscal externalities in each regime. We then quantify the effects of switching from the observed tax system to each of the four regimes in Japan and Germany. We find that the Benthamite or rent-seeking regime best approximates the Japanese system, whereas the tax harmonization regime does so for Germany. We also quantify the welfare effects of switching to the different regimes.
Keywords:
H71
H72
R51
Property taxes
Tax competition
Efficiency
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