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RA scoreboarding: Return address stack protection in RISC-V
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DOI：10.1016/j.sysarc.2026.103875.png)
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Abstract
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RISC-V processor cores range from lightweight embedded to full-featured general-purpose designs. Their open-source nature and growing popularity have accelerated adoption and introduced significant security vulnerabilities. Due to their In-Order and Out-Of-Order (OoO) execution, these cores are susceptible to attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, and classical buffer overflows. This work is particularly focused on threats to control flow, such as return address (ra) corruption and subsequent side-channel leaks. Exploits like Spectre-RAS and Stack-Based Buffer Overflow (SBFO) can enable severe attacks like Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). These attacks hijack a system’s control flow to execute malicious instruction sequences, directly violating its Control-Flow Integrity (CFI).
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