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RATIONAL GROUPTHINK

delete2020-07-08
delete18
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OA
AI
M
Matan Harel *
E
Elchanan Mossel
P
Philipp Strack
O
Omer Tamuz
DOI:10.1093/qje/qjaa026delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We study how long-lived rational agents learn from repeatedly observing a private signal and each others' actions. With normal signals, a group of any size learns more slowly than just four agents who directly observe each others' private signals in each period. Similar results apply to general signal structures. We identify rational groupthink-in which agents ignore their private signals and choose the same action for long periods of time-as the cause of this failure of information aggregation.
Keywords:
INFORMATION AGGREGATION
PERCOLATION
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Journal

Quarterly Journal of Economics cover
Quarterly Journal of Economics
IF:
12.7
Papers:
1.2K
Citations:
4.1W

Organization

C
California Institute of Technology
Scholars:
2.9W
Papers: 2.5W
Citations: 4.9W
Y
Yale University
Scholars:
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Papers: 6.0W
Citations: 10.0W
T
Tel Aviv University
Scholars:
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Papers: 3.0W
Citations: 3.6W
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