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Rationalizing sharing rules
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DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
A partnership can yield a return-a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different notions of proportionality and, in particular, a convenient subclass specified by a single inequality aversion parameter. We also explore when a rule can be rationalized by more general welfare function. Our central results extend to a wider class of resource allocation problems.
Keywords:
Sharing
Consistency
Axioms
Welfare maximization
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