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Recycling Strategies for New Energy Vehicle Power Batteries with Consideration of Pricing Mechanism
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DOI：10.3390/batteries12080297.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
There is a large and rapidly growing stock of retired power batteries from new energy vehicles in China. Unregulated informal recycling and improper disposal of these waste batteries trigger serious environmental hazards. Though a batch of regulatory policies on battery recycling have been released in recent years, the power battery recycling sector still faces prominent governance bottlenecks, especially ambiguous responsibility division and poor implementability under the entrusted recycling mode. To fill the existing research gap regarding tripartite interest conflicts and pricing mechanisms in entrusted recycling, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model covering power battery producers, recyclers and government regulators. Two pricing models are further developed to distinguish producer self-operated recycling and third-party entrusted recycling channels. Numerical simulation is adopted to investigate multi-stakeholder interest contradictions, dynamic evolutionary trajectories and equilibrium stability of the recycling system, and the influences of subsidy intensity, supervision intensity and recycling cost on participants’ strategic choices are quantitatively analyzed. The research results demonstrate that inadequate government supervision and insufficient economic returns for formal recyclers serve as the primary obstacles hindering the effective deployment of entrusted recycling. An inherent and reasonable price gap exists between self-operated and entrusted recycling modes. Essentially, the price differential of standardized entrusted recycling represents the profit margin conceded by producers to recyclers instead of direct financial subsidies. To solve existing industry problems, this study proposes targeted recommendations for tripartite collaboration. The government should refine the regulatory framework of Extended Producer Responsibility and adopt differentiated reward and penalty mechanisms. Producers are expected to standardize entrusted recycling management and formulate a scientific pricing range for retired batteries. Recyclers ought to advance recycling technologies and maintain standardized operations. Collective efforts from all stakeholders can facilitate the long-term sustainability of the closed-loop recycling system for retired power batteries.
Keywords:
power batteries
three-party evolutionary game
new energy vehicles
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