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Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
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DOI：10.1086/728111.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Many scarce public resources are allocated at below-market-clearing prices and sometimes for free. Such nonmarket mechanisms sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity. We develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents are characterized by a privately observed willingness to pay for quality, a publicly observed label, and a social welfare weight. A market designer controls allocation and pricing of a set of objects of heterogeneous quality and maximizes the expectation of a welfare function. The designer does not directly observe individuals' social welfare weights. We derive structural insights about the form of the optimal mechanism, leading to a framework for determining how and when to use nonmarket mechanisms.
Keywords:
PUBLIC PROVISION
SELF-SELECTION
PRIVATE GOODS
IN-KIND
DESIGN
TRANSFERS
TAX
CASH
ECONOMICS
Journal
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6.3
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2.6K
Citations:
3.2W