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Regulating Collusion

delete2023-09-13
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OA
AI
C
Chassang, Sylvain *
O
Ortner, Juan
DOI:10.1146/annurev-economics-051520-021936delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We attempt to provide a systemic view of the process of regulating collusion, including detection and prosecution as well as bargaining between firms and regulators via consent orders, the production of evidence, and containment measures that may be taken if collusion cannot be addressed with more direct means. In addition, we try to do justice to the peculiarities of the legal system: Modeling the courts as they are, rather than as economists think they should be, is essential for economic analysis to improve the way collusion is regulated.
Keywords:
collusion
regulation
Twombly
burden of proof
safe tests
consent orders
artificial intelligence

Journal

Annual Review of Economics cover
Annual Review of Economics
IF:
11.4
Papers:
356
Citations:
4.5K

Organization

B
boston university
Scholars:
3.8W
Papers: 3.2W
Citations: 67
P
Princeton University
Scholars:
2.1W
Papers: 2.3W
Citations: 5.1W
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

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