.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Regulating environmental threats
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1007/s10640-007-9127-2.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Environmental consequences of natural resource exploitation often entail threats of future occurrences of detrimental abrupt events rather than (or in addition to) inflicting a damage gradually. The possibility of abrupt occurrence of climate-change related calamities is a case in mind. The uncertainty associated with the realization of these threats and their public-bad nature complicate the design of optimal economic response. We derive a Pigouvian hazard tax schedule that implements the socially optimal outcome. The tax is based on the expected cost of the hazard-generating activities and serves to reduce hazardous emissions well in advance of the catastrophic occurrence. A numerical example illustrates possible effects of the proposed regulation scheme. Implications for climate policy are discussed.
Keywords:
abrupt event
emission
climate change
regulation
Pigouvian tax
hazard rate
uncertainty
Journal
IF:
3.4
Papers:
2.7K
Citations:
6.5K