.png){kind=icon}
Return
Relational Knowledge Transfers
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1257/aer.20160194.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We study how relational contracts mitigate Becker's classic problem of providing general human capital when training contracts are incomplete. The firm's profit-maximizing agreement is a multiperiod apprenticeship in which the novice is trained gradually over time and eventually receives all knowledge. The firm adopts a 1/e rule, whereby at the beginning of the relationship the novice is trained, for free, just enough to produce a fraction 1/e of the efficient output. After that, the novice earns all additional knowledge with labor. This rule causes inefficiently lengthy relationships that grow longer the more patient the players. A minimum wage is welfare enhancing.
Keywords:
OR-OUT CONTRACTS
IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
SECURITY DESIGN
CONTINUOUS-TIME
LABOR-MARKET
LIFE-CYCLE
INVESTMENT
FIRMS
INFORMATION
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
11.6
Papers:
5.0K
Citations:
7.5W
Organization
Cited Papers
ShareSave
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveOptimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous-time agency model.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
ShareSaveShareSave
View more