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Relationship preserving multi-attribute reverse auction: A web-based experimental analysis
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DOI：10.1016/j.cie.2013.07.007.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Repeated use of reverse auction often degrades the buyer-supplier relationship. Theoretical studies show that providing incentive to the losing but competing suppliers can keep them interested to participate in future auctions thereby maintaining a healthy level of competition. We conduct web-based experiments to validate this theoretical observation in multi-attribute reverse auctions. We compare incentive-oriented and standard multi-attribute reverse auctions and demonstrate that the results in the laboratory setting corroborate the theoretical findings. Adopting incentive-oriented mechanism, the buyer is able to provide better utility to suppliers while protecting her own. We conclude that such a mechanism can reduce the negative perception of the suppliers and help build better buyer-supplier relationship in the long run. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
E-procurement
Multi-attribute auction mechanism
Web-based laboratory experiments
Design of experiments
Journal
IF:
6.5
Papers:
1.0W
Citations:
3.8W