.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Reputation with Analogical Reasoning
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1093/qje/qjs031.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that the short-run players make inferences by analogical reasoning, meaning that they correctly identify the average strategy of each type of long-run player, but do not recognize how this play varies across histories. Concentrating on 2 x 2 games, we provide a characterization of equilibrium payoffs, establishing a payoff bound for the rational long-run player that can be strictly larger than the familiar Stackelberg bound. We also provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior, showing that play begins with either a reputation-building or a reputation-spending stage (depending on parameters), followed by a reputation-manipulation stage.
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
12.7
Papers:
1.2K
Citations:
4.1W
Organization
No organization information available