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Responsibility: The tie that binds

delete2012-01-01
delete39
PRE
AI
C
Cynthia Cryder *
G
George Loewenstein
DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.09.009delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
People share significantly more money with others in common lab paradigms like the dictator game than they do in real life. What accounts for this difference? Paradigms like the dictator game link each recipient to a single dictator with the implication that each recipient can receive funds from only one person. We argue that this burden of responsibility to a single recipient helps to explain high levels of laboratory sharing. In two experiments-a modified dictator game experiment and a charitable giving experiment-participants donated significantly more to others when they were solely responsible for a recipient's outcome than when the responsibility for a recipient was potentially shared. Taken together with past findings from social psychology and experimental economics, the results show how unambiguous responsibility for a single recipient increases generosity. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Altruism
Generosity
Decision making
Economics
External validity

Journal

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology cover
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
IF:
3.1
Papers:
3.7K
Citations:
1.5W

Organization

C
Carnegie Mellon University
Scholars:
1.4W
Papers: 1.4W
Citations: 2.7W
W
washington university (wustl)
Scholars:
5.5W
Papers: 4.5W
Citations: 70