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Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism
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DOI：10.1111/rati.70030.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
One classic objection to Objectivism about ought is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so-called Three-Option-Cases, the most famous of which is Jackson's case featuring a doctor called Jill. Some philosophers deny this orthodoxy and claim that Objectivism can yet account for our intuitions in such cases. In this paper, I critically evaluate such attempts and draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with risk and recklessness. I argue that an adequate form of Objectivism must make room for a distinctly moral relevance of recklessness. To assess Objectivism's chances of doing so, I make an important distinction between two ways in which risks can matter morally. As I argue, the kind of relevance which is required for extensionally adequate verdicts in all Three-Option-Cases is inevitably incompatible with all plausible forms of Objectivism.
Keywords:
objectivism about ought
perspectivism about ought
recklessness
risk
subjective and objective consequentialism
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