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Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

delete2005-04-01
delete16
PRE
AI
M
Makoto Yokoo
Y
Yuko Sakurai
S
Shigeo Matsubara
DOI：10.1016/j.dss.2003.10.009delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient. (c) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
double auction
mechanism design

Journal

Decision Support Systems cover
Decision Support Systems
IF:
6.8
Papers:
3.8K
Citations:
1.5W

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No organization information available