arrow
Return

Robust Pluralism About Philosophical Progress

delete2026-02-01
delete0
delete
OA
AI
J
John Bengson *
T
Terence Cuneo
R
Russ Shafer‐Landau
DOI:10.1111/phis.70008delete
deleteOriginal
deleteShare
deleteSave
View PDF
Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
This article argues that there are two fundamentally different types of alethic and epistemic progress in philosophy. It is widely assumed that such progress is to be assessed by reference to the quantity or quality of philosophy's product (i.e., a type of output or outcome, such as true answers, coherent views, knowledge, or understanding), rather than to the manner in which philosophy is done-its performance. That assumption is mistaken. Performance progress is not reducible to product progress. This carries implications for debates about peer disagreement, epistemic consequentialism, philosophical methods, and the idea of philosophy as a spiritual exercise.
Keywords:
DISAGREEMENT
AI Summary

AI Summary

Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.

Journal

P
Philosophical Issues
IF:
1
Papers:
18
Citations:
0

Organization

U
university of texas austin
Scholars:
2.4W
Papers: 2.0W
Citations: 54
U
university of texas system
Scholars:
18.5W
Papers: 15.6W
Citations: 210
U
university of vermont
Scholars:
1.1W
Papers: 9.7K
Citations: 17
researcher View more organizations