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Runtime Randomized Relocation of Crypto Libraries for Mitigating Cache Attacks
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DOI：10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3101638.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Crypto libraries such as OpenSSL and Libgcrypt are essential building blocks for implementing secure cloud services. Unfortunately, these libraries are subject to cache side-channel attacks, which are more devastating in cloud environments where inevitable cache contention among different tenants occurs. Previous approaches for mitigating cache side-channel attacks have limitations in terms of the deployability and security; these hinder utilization in cloud services. In this paper, we propose an R2-relocator, a novel library protection technique based on moving target defence. When injected into a running process, the R2-relocator performs randomized relocation of the library during runtime. By doing this, it transforms a vulnerable crypto library into one that randomly changes its memory (cache) location, thereby preventing the delivery of cache side-channel attacks against the library. The proposed technique achieves robust protection against cache side-channel attacks for all crypto libraries, even those containing unpatched critical vulnerabilities, without the need for reconfiguration of the library. Extensive evaluations of security, performance, and deployability of the R2-relocator demonstrate its effectiveness for secure cloud services.
Keywords:
Libraries
Cryptography
Security
Cloud computing
Side-channel attacks
Runtime
Computer bugs
Cache side-channel attack
crypto library
moving target defence
attack mitigation
secure cloud computing
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