.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Safeguarding Quantum Key Distribution Through Detection Randomization
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1109/JSTQE.2014.2361793.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a quantum key distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the single-photon detectors. The countermeasure is based on the creation of modes that are not deterministically accessible to the eavesdropper. We experimentally show that the use of beamsplitters and extra single-photon detectors at the receiver station passively creates randomized spatial modes that erase any knowledge the eavesdropper might have gained when using bright-light faked states. Additionally, we experimentally show a detector-scrambling approach where the random selection of the detector used for each measurement-equivalent to an active spatial mode randomization-hashes out the side-channel open by the detection efficiency mismatch-based attacks. The proposed combined countermeasure represents a practical and readily implementable solution against the main classes of quantum hacking attacks aimed on the single-photon detector so far, without intervening on the inner working of the devices.
Keywords:
Avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
quantum communications
quantum cryptography
quantum detectors
quantum hacking and countermeasures
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
I
IF:
5.1
Papers:
5.6K
Citations:
1.2W