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Schelling games on graphs
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DOI：10.1016/j.artint.2021.103576.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We study strategic games inspired by Schelling's seminal model of residential segregation. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple types; each agent either aims to maximize the fraction of her neighbors who are of her own type, or occupies a node of the graph and never moves away. We consider two natural variants of this model: in jump games agents can jump to empty nodes of the graph to increase their utility, while in swap games they can swap positions with other agents. We investigate the existence, computational complexity, and quality of equilibrium assignments in these games, both from a social welfare perspective and from a diversity perspective. Some of our results extend to a more general setting where the preferences of the agents over their neighbors are defined by a social network rather than a partition into types. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Schelling games
Equilibrium analysis
Price of anarchy
Computational complexity
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