.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Selective-Memory Equilibrium
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1086/731412.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We study agents who are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred. To understand the long-run effects of selective memory, we propose selective-memory equilibrium. We show that if the agent's behavior converges, their limit strategy is a selective-memory equilibrium, and we provide a sufficient condition for behavior to converge. We use this equilibrium concept to explore the consequences of several well-documented biases. We also show that there is a close connection between selective-memory equilibria and the outcomes of misspecified learning.
Keywords:
DECISION-MAKING
MODEL
JUDGMENT
CONFIDENCE
GAMBLERS
MOOD
RISK
Journal
IF:
6.3
Papers:
2.6K
Citations:
3.2W