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Sequential Cursed Equilibrium

delete2026-03-01
delete1
PRE
AI
C
Cohen, Shani *
L
Li, Shengwu
DOI：10.1257/aer.20230309delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information. (JEL C73, D44, D71, D81, D83, D91)
Keywords:
HYPOTHETICAL THINKING
INFORMATION
AUCTIONS
FAILURES
GAMES

Journal

American Economic Review cover
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
Papers:
5.0K
Citations:
7.5W

Organization

H
Harvard University
Scholars:
26.5W
Papers: 22.0W
Citations: 28.7W
H
hebrew university of jerusalem
Scholars:
2.4K
Papers: 1.1K
Citations: 0