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Set-valued TU-games
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DOI：10.1016/S0377-2217(03)00398-9.png)
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Abstract
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The goal of this paper is to explore solution concepts for set-valued TU-games. Several stability conditions can be defined since one can have various interpretations of an improvement within the multicriteria framework. We present two different core solution concepts and explore the relationships among them. These concepts generalize the classic core solution for scalar games and can be considered under different preference structures. We give characterizations for the non-emptiness of these core sets and apply the results to four multiobjective operational research games. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
multiobjective analysis
game theory
core
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